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ABSTRACT 
 
The world is a system that is comprised of many different types of systems that 
are all intertwined, creating a map of the inner workings of modern day society. The 
very existence of systems introduces conditions of failure, which are often referred to as 
hazards. Conducting a hazard analysis of a system can help designers foresee these 
undesired conditions of failure. The limitations of current hazard identification methods 
must be addressed because systems are still failing in unexpected ways. In order to 
create a new method for identifying hazards, an in-depth literature review is completed 
to understand work that has already been done, and in what areas current work can be 
improved. It is suggested that accidents may be viewed from an energy perspective. To 
explore this perspective, a case study exercise that analyzes product liability cases 
involving mechanical systems is completed. With the validation of seeing accidents from 
an energy perspective, a general structure for the method is proposed.  
 The new partially automated method known as the ETCHIM focuses on energy 
within the system and aids the designer in identifying hazards based on any unwanted 
changes or transfers of that energy. To assess the ETCHIM, an experiment involving 
human subjects is designed and conducted that compares the performance of the 
ETCHIM to the existing What-If/Checklist method. The results of the experiment show 
that the ETCHIM identifies more hazards than the What-If/Checklist. A change is made 
to the ETCHIM’s automation that is a suggested improvement of the method. A second 
experiment is conducted to test the performance of the improved ETCHIM against the 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The world is a system that is comprised of many different types of systems that 
are all intertwined, creating a map of the inner workings of modern day society. 
Thinking of the world as a system requires an understanding of what actually makes up a 
system. In general, a system can be defined as “an interacting combination, at any level 
of complexity, of people, materials, tools, machines, software, facilities, and procedures 
designed to work together for some common purpose” [1]. In these terms, a system can 
be characterized in several different ways such as economical, social, or technological. 
For example, an automobile system is comprised of moving parts such as the 
transmission, engine, axle, and wheels that all operate interdependently to achieve its 
mission of ground transportation. System components such as cooling/heating, radio, 
windows, and adjustable seats work together to ensure comfort of the driver and any 
passengers. An automobile can be considered its own system, but further abstraction will 
reveal that an automobile, along with other automobiles, traffic lights, and roads, is a 
component within the economical ground transportation system. Different levels of 
abstraction detail different systems, but they all come together in a cohesive manner 
allowing society to effectively operate. But real-life experience reveals that systems do 
not always operate as expected, or intended. A system not operating as intended can lead 
to system failure, causing accidents or mishaps. [2] 
         The very existence of systems introduces conditions of failure, which are often 
referred to as hazards. More specifically, a hazard is “[a]ny real or potential condition 
that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, 
equipment, or property; or damage to the environment” [3]. Conducting a hazard 
analysis of a system can help designers foresee these undesired conditions of failure. 
         People actively analyze hazards all throughout the day, potentially without even 
realizing it. Part of living a safe life is being able to assess a situation to determine any 
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inherent danger, and proceed accordingly. From an engineering perspective, hazard 
analysis is the process of identifying hazards, hazard effects, and hazard causal factors so 
as to “identify potential causes of accidents (…), so they can be eliminated or controlled 
in design or operations before damage occurs” [4]. The importance of hazard analysis is 
deeply rooted in the necessity to design inherently safe systems in order to uphold the 
first fundamental canon of engineers; to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare 
of the public [5]. 
As aforementioned, the identification of hazards is the first step in the hazard 
analysis process once the system is appropriately defined. Operating under the belief that 
the initial identification of hazards determines the effectiveness of the proceeding 
analysis, this project is specifically interested in the identification phase of the hazard 
analysis process. This belief is rooted in the idea that without the initial identification of 
a hazard, it will never be considered in the later analysis phases. If a hazard is never 
analyzed, the system’s designers will not appropriately eliminate or mitigate the 
particular conditions associated with that hazard. This can lead to the occurrence of 
accidents that were completely unforeseen. Further, it is believed that the existence of 
unidentified hazards can conceivably lead to an inflated confidence in the final design. 
Thus, the need for a rigorous hazard identification method. 
The current hazard identification processes are reliant on individuals with 
domain expertise, creativity in brainstorming, checklists, and “on subjective evaluation 
by those constructing the system” [4]. The limitations of current hazard identification 
methods must be addressed because systems are still failing in unexpected ways. 
Accidents are still occurring due to unsafe system designs, such as the severe 
hand injury sustained by a construction worker in 2005 when his hand slipped into the 
blade of a table saw he was using to cut a piece of wood [6]. Or the tragic death of a 
scissor lift operator in 2008 who fell from the lift when it suddenly became unstable [7]. 
In an attempt to address the continued issue of hazards going unidentified during the 
design process of systems, the Energy Transfer/Change Hazard Identification Method, or 
ETCHIM, is developed.  
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In order to create a new method for identifying hazards, an in-depth research 
process is completed to understand work that has already been done, and in what areas 
current work can be improved. During the literature review, it is realized that accidents 
may be viewed from an energy perspective. To determine the validity of the theory that 
accidents can be interpreted as an unwanted change in energy within a system, a case 
study exercise that analyzes product liability cases involving mechanical systems is 
completed. After the entire research process, a general structure for the method is 
proposed.  
The new method known as the ETCHIM focuses on energy within the system 
and aids the designer in identifying hazards based on any unwanted changes or transfers 
of that energy. To assess the ETCHIM, an experiment involving human subjects is 
designed and conducted that compares the performance of the ETCHIM to the existing 
What-If/Checklist method. The results of the experiment show that the ETCHIM 
identifies more hazards than the What-If/Checklist. 
The proceeding chapters detail the steps taken to develop and create the 
ETCHIM. First, a discussion of existing hazard analysis and identification is provided 
that helps scope the relevance of the project. After proposing an underlying theory of the 
new method, the case study exercise that tests the validity of the underlying theory is 
detailed. Once an underlying theory for the method is substantiated, the development of 
the method’s procedural steps is explained before discussing the need and creation of an 
algorithm that partially automates the method’s process. The design and conduction of 
an experiment that tests the performance of the ETCHIM relative to an existing method 
is then described, followed by a discussion of what the results of the experiment suggest. 
Based on the results of the experiment, a supposed ‘improvement’ to the ETCHIM is 
explained. A discussion of a second experiment that tests the performance of the 
‘improved’ ETCHIM relative to the ‘unimproved’ ETCHIM is provided. The results of 
the second experiment are then discussed. Lastly, the contribution of the project on 
hazard identification and potential opportunities for future work are discussed.  
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CHAPTER II  
RELATED WORK  
 
 
This chapter discusses some of the more notable hazard identification and 
analysis methods, along with an overview explaining which methods align with the work 
done in this project. The considerations for relevance are rooted in the process, output, 
and theory of the methods. 
 
Overview of Hazard Analysis Methods 
 This section provides an overview of several of the most prominent hazard 
analysis methods. 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a technique designed to determine the root 
cause and probability of a top undesired event. It can be used proactively during the 
developmental phase of a system in order to appropriately influence the design. The 
FTA can also be used in a reactive manner to aid in the process of accident 
reconstruction. A graphical representation of the system under analysis is created and 
logic gates are used to connect system events and potential faults to display the 
appropriate causes and consequences leading to a top undesired event. An FTA can be 
either qualitative or quantitative. Although the quantitative FTA provides more 
meaningful results, it requires more experience, time, and logs that contain component 
failure data. The results from the FTA can be used to verify safety requirements, identify 
safety deficiencies and mode failures, establish preventative measures and requirements, 
and evaluate the adequacy of established measures. Overall, the FTA uses knowledge of 
the system and experienced personnel to draft a graphical representation of fault events 
that are connected using logic gates to determine the root cause of an undesired event, 
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the probability of the undesired event, and identify high-risk paths within the system. [1] 
[8] [9] [10] [11] [12]  
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
 The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tool used to assess the 
effects that certain failure modes have on a system, similar to the FTA. The FMEA 
provides a quantitative analysis through the use of failure data of the system components 
to determine probabilities of failure. It is applicable to all types of systems and can be 
used at any level during the detailed design phase. There are three different approaches 
to conduct a FMEA, which are functional, structural, and hybrid. The functional 
approach focuses on the functions of the different components of the system and how 
they could go wrong or unsatisfied. The structural approach focuses on failure modes 
that are concerned with the hardware that makes up the system. The hybrid approach 
combines the functional and structural approaches by starting with the functional and 
then transitioning into the structural so that all functions and hardware components of a 
system are analyzed. However, the FMEA fails to identify all possible system hazards 
because it does not consider any multi-component failure states. Therefore, the FMEA 
should be used in conjunction with other system analysis techniques. [1] [13] [14] [15] 
[16] [17] 
 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 The Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a hazard analysis and identification 
technique that can be used to assess any project during the preliminary design phase. 
Conducting a PHA during a design phase when few detailed design specifications are 
available allows for changes to be easily made, and even mold the eventual 
specifications. Because the purpose of the PHA is to analyze hazards that have already 
been identified by a hazard identification method, the main areas of focus are the causal 
factors, effects, level of risk, and mitigation measures of the hazards. In order to perform 
a PHA, hazard and mishap checklists, along with other information sources such as a 
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functional flow diagram, reliability block diagram, equipment list, and system design, 
are compiled and referenced. Using the information sources and initial list of identified 
hazards, a team of designers fill out the PHA worksheet, which includes information 
such as the hazard under analysis, potential causes of the hazard, the effects if the hazard 
is realized, and initial and final risk indexes. Once the specifications of the design 
become detailed enough, the PHA is terminated. [1] [18] [19] [20]  
 
Methods Relating to Desired Process and Output 
The following hazard identification methods have similar structured 
brainstorming processes that provide a list of hazards as the output. This particular 
format is the desired format for the ETCHIM. 
 
Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) 
 The Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) is a hazard identification method that is used 
during the conceptual design phase of a product or system. The purpose of the PHL is 
for the team of designers to develop a list of hazards that exist within the defined scope 
of the analysis. There are many different scopes within a design that can include 
hardware, operations, or software, to name a few. In this manner, the system can be 
broken up into categories of the system that allow the design team to focus on certain 
areas at a time. Once the mission of the scope under analysis is defined and the 
components identified, a table is filled out that details information about the system 
items, the hazards associated with those items, and the effects of the hazards. The 
process of documenting potential hazards for each item is heavily reliant on 
brainstorming and referencing appropriate hazard checklists. However, the checklists 
utilized may not be fully adequate, which defines a disadvantage of the method.  Overall, 
the input of the PHL is information regarding the mission of the system and its 
components and the output is a list of hazards associated with identified system items 
that can be used for further system analysis such as the Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
(PHA). [1] [18] [21] [22] 
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What-If/Checklist 
 The What-If/Checklist method helps the design team identify hazards within a 
system during any design phase. Hazards are identified through a structured 
brainstorming session by combining the features of the What-If Analysis method and the 
Checklist Analysis method. Once the system’s mission and components are defined, the 
analysis begins with the design team asking the question, “What if…?” This question is 
asked in the context of what could go wrong within the system that would cause an 
accident. For every “What if” situation, a brief description of the potential consequences 
of the particular accident is provided. The designers use their knowledge of the system’s 
design and creativity to brainstorm as many hazards as possible within the system. The 
structure of the process is inherent in the use of hazard checklists to help the design team 
brainstorm hazards. However, a checklist only contains what its author decides is 
important, which can be limiting when analyzing a new system. Like the PHL, the What-
If/Checklist method is only designed to produce a list of hazards and does not complete 
any further analysis. [23] [24] [25]  
 
Method Relating to Desired Theory 
The following method assesses hazards within a system that are derived from 
energy sources, and is based on the theory that the unwanted transfer of energy can 
cause an accident. The theory that accidents occur due to the unwanted transfer of 
energy within a system is similar to the baseline theory of ETCHIM. 
   
Energy Trace Barrier Analysis (ETBA) 
 The Energy Trace Barrier Analysis (ETBA) is a method used during the 
conceptual and detailed design phases that determines hazards by identifying dangerous 
energy sources within the system. By identifying energy sources, the design team can 
trace the flow of energy within the system. The purpose of tracking the energy flows is 
rooted in the theory that accidents can occur when there is an unwanted transfer of 
energy from its source to another system component. Once the energy flows are 
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identified, the barriers protecting the other system components from these flows are 
assessed to determine if the imposed barriers are appropriate for hazard mitigation or 
elimination. In order to complete the assessment process, a table is used to document and 
organize details such as the specific energy source, the hazard associated with the 
source, targets, an initial mishap risk index, the imposed barrier, and the final mishap 
risk index. The targets are system components that would be adversely affected by an 
unwanted energy flow transfer. The initial mishap risk index is an evaluation of the 
hazard risk that is determined by the combination of the qualitative frequency and 
severity before the barrier is imposed, and the final mishap risk index is the same 
evaluation after the barrier is imposed. Overall, the input to the ETBA is design 
knowledge and identified energy sources within the system, and the output is tabulated 
information that assesses the energy flow barriers in terms of risk. [1] [25] [26] [27] 
 
Takeaways 
Concluding the literature review, knowledge is gained about the existing hazard 
identification methods along with realizations about areas of weakness that can be 
improved. For the scope of this project only methods that are used for hazard 
identification are considered for improvement. As previously stated, the PHL and What-
If/Checklist methods are of particular interest based on the results they produce and the 
general process followed to complete them. Both the PHL and What-If/Checklist 
methods rely on brainstorming and hazard checklists. Brainstorming is a powerful 
identification technique, especially when the design team is multidisciplinary and 
experienced. The checklists ensure that the designers have considered as many known 
hazards as possible while guiding the brainstorming process. While established hazard 
checklists identify many hazards, they are confined to accidents that have already 
occurred. When engineering a completely new system, current methods can overlook 
new hazards due to the reliance on information stemming from existing systems. The 
ETBA is not included as a hazard identification process, but rather a hazard analysis 
methodology with an underlying theory that is of particular interest. The theory that 
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accidents occur when there is an undesired change in energy within the system is seen as 
a way to dissect the cause of accidents and think of it in terms of something widely 
studied and exists in every system: energy. It is unknown what future systems will 
actually consist of, but the one thing that is certain is there will be energy involved. 
Creating a hazard identification method that uses the energy within the system to predict 
hazardous scenarios could result in an increase in the number of hazards identified, 
potentially leading to safer systems. In regards to the proposed process of the new 
method, the studied behavior of energy adds structure without taking away from the 
creativity of brainstorming. 
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CHAPTER III  
THEORY VALIDATION  
 
This chapter describes the steps taken to develop the ETCHIM such as validating 
the theory that accidents occur due to unwanted changes in energy and building the 
procedure, which includes the creation of an algorithm. 
 
Validation Approach 
The best way to learn about the causes of accidents is to study incidents that have 
already occurred. Studying events that have occurred gives the researcher confidence 
that the information is not hypothetical, but rather stems from real-world circumstances. 
This type of data is desirable when validating a theory that could eventually be used to 
predict real-world accidents.  
In order to analyze an accident appropriately, finding a well-documented and 
accurate description of the events leading up to the incident is a necessity. A suitable 
place to find such descriptions is in product liability cases. Accidents found in product 
liability cases are serious and controversial enough for the victim to claim, in court, that 
the engineered product or system defected. Also, any product liability case analyzed 
must stem from a mechanical system that contains kinetic and gravitational potential 
energy to fit the scope of the project. 
  
Validation Activities 
 In order to validate the proposed relationship between accidents and energy, 
product liability cases in the WestlawNext Database through Texas A&M are analyzed 
[28]. To find detailed information about a specific accident, the WestLaw database is 
used to find the name of a product liability case that is mechanical in nature. The name 
of the case is then entered into the Google search engine to find proceedings regarding 
the accident. A proceeding is selected and then the search for the accident information 
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begins. Sufficient information used for documentation includes a description of the 
events immediately leading up to the accident along with a statement concerning the 
injuries sustained by the victim. The following is an excerpt from a case that provides 
sufficient detail: 
 
“As the sheet moved into the machine, a sliver of metal that extended outward from the 
roll caught the soft part of the palm of his hand and pulled it into the stripper fingers. 
The force of his hand striking the stripper fingers caused them to be sucked through the 
rollers and into the cutters along with plaintiff's right hand and arm causing severe 
injuries.” [29] 
 
In some instances, the information provided about a case is not sufficient enough to 
understand the events leading up to the accident and any resulting consequences. The 
next excerpt is an example of a case that provides insufficient detail: 
 
“This is a personal injury, product liability case regarding a shredder manufactured and 
marketed by Defendant Deere & Company a/k/a John Deere Company (John Deere). (...) 
Defendant STI and/or GTC misrepresented and/or failed to disclose or provide proper 
instructions for the lifting of the shredder in question for the foreseeable situation giving 
rise to this accident and cause which separately, independently or in combination with 
the above defects amounts to negligence and actual misrepresentation which was the 
proximate cause of the accident in question.” [30] 
 
Cases that do not provide sufficient information are removed from the assessment and 
not documented. 
In order to appropriately scope the project, only cases mechanical in nature are 
analyzed, which restricts the different energy types to kinetic and gravitational potential. 
Overall, 82 accidents with sufficient accident information are analyzed (see Appendix 
for list of cases), which include ladders, elevators, saws, grinders, or conveyor belts. For 
this project, kinetic energy is defined as horizontal and/or vertical movement, which 
includes rotation. Possessing gravitational potential energy is any component whose 
center of gravity is ever above ground. Within the analysis of all 82 cases, the resulting 
injury, energy forms involved in the accident, qualitative size and weight of energized 
component(s), qualitative magnitude of the energy, and an interpretation of the accident 
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in terms of energy transfers are documented. The information involving component size, 
weight, and magnitude are broken up into qualitative categories of large, medium, and 
small. For size and weight, the average human would be in the medium category. So 
anything reasonably smaller or larger than the average human is categorized as small or 
large, respectively. Concerning energy magnitude, the categorization of small, medium, 
and large depends on the type of energy. For kinetic energy, the magnitude is directly 
related to the speed in which the component is moving. A component has a large kinetic 
energy if it is moving, or rotating, at a speed faster than an average human can sprint. 
For example, a rotating saw blade has a large magnitude of kinetic energy. A medium 
kinetic energy is translation or rotation within the range of how fast an average human 
moves without technological help. Moving or rotating slower than how fast a human 
moves is categorized as small magnitude. For gravitational potential, a large magnitude 
is any height above a one-story building. A medium magnitude is the height of the 
average person, within reason, and a small magnitude is a height any lower than that. 
Table 1 displays the type of information required for the analysis that is extracted from 
each accident description. 
 
Table 1: Information extracted from the description of the accident 
Case Injury Energy 
type 










Kinetic Medium  Small Large The accident 
occurred when the 
large kinetic energy 
of the stripper’s 
fingers was 




between the cutters 
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Lifts and Ladders 
         Fifteen injuries are documented for the lifts and ladders category. Most injuries 
occurred when the human operator fell from the lift or ladder while using it to complete 
a task. The rest of the injuries involve the lift or ladder failing in a way that the operator 
fell along with the rest of the system. 
         From an energy perspective, the accidents occurred when a potential energy 
within the system inadvertently turned into kinetic energy. In general, the larger the 
height from which the operator fell, the more severely the victim was injured. It has been 
observed that the greater the potential energy within the system, the more hazardous the 
accidents can be. 
 
Saws and Blades 
         Fifty injuries are documented for the saws and blades category. The most 
common accident of the fifty occurred when any body part of the operator came in 
contact with a sharp blade operating at high rotational or translational speeds. In some 
cases, a ‘kickback’ occurred when the blade came in contact with a denser portion of the 
material being cut, and other times, the user inadvertently touched the blade while in 
operation. There are many different causes for the user’s inadvertent contact with the 
blade. Some cases indicated that a piece of clothing worn by the operator had been 
pulled into the blade’s rotation. A small percentage of the accidents do not involve the 
operator directly coming into contact with the blade, such as some of the ‘kickback’ 
cases in which the material the operator was cutting was forced upwards striking the 
operator. In a few other cases, the energy of the rotating blade within the system was 
transferred to a smaller component by accident causing the smaller component to strike 
and injure a human. An example of this is one of the lawn mower cases in which the 
quickly rotating blades of the mower came in contact with a rock in the grass causing it 
to fly out from underneath the mower, striking a nearby person. 
         From an energy perspective, the accidents occurred when the large kinetic energy 
of a blade was transferred to the human operator through direct contact. Or, the accidents 
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occurred when the large rotational kinetic energy of a blade was transferred to a 
stationary object resulting in either a ‘kickback’ of the blade or the object inadvertently 
gaining translational energy. The more mass the object being cut has, the more likely the 
saw blade itself will experience a ‘kickback’ rather than the object. There is clearly not a 
linear relationship between the mass of the object coming into contact with the blade, 
inadvertently or not, and the severity of the resulting injury. 
 
 Grinders 
         Out of the eleven cases involving grinders, ten of them involve the rotating 
grinder shattering, or breaking, into smaller pieces during use causing the operator to be 
struck by the quickly translating shards. One accident occurred when the quickly rotating 
grinder came loose from the spindle that attached it to the rest of its housing unit. When 
the grinder came loose, its rotational kinetic energy turned into translational kinetic 
energy and struck the operator. 
         From an energy perspective, every accident occurred when the large rotational 
kinetic energy of a system component inadvertently turned into translational kinetic 
energy. It is important to note that in most of the cases, the grinder broke into small 
shards. The shards traveling at a high velocity often posed a greater threat than an 
unbroken grinder because the shards had the ability to actually pierce through the 
operator’s skin and protective equipment. For grinders, the idea that the larger the energy 
the more hazardous the accident does not necessarily hold true because the smaller 
shards may be considered less hazardous due to their smaller mass, but in many cases 
they are more hazardous. 
 
Cranes 
         Only three cases are documented involving cranes and each accident was very 
different in nature. The first accident occurred when the crane was transferring a load, 
which hit the stationary cab of the crane causing the load to fall, severely injuring a 
nearby worker. Another accident occurred when the boom attached to a crane 
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unexpectedly fell, which resulted in the death of the victim. In the third case, there were 
many environmental factors such as high winds and waves that led to the failure of the 
crane’s structure leading to the human operator’s injury. 
         From an energy perspective, in the first case, there was a sudden change in the 
kinetic energy of the load when it hit the cab, which led to an undesired change in the 
load’s potential energy into kinetic energy as it fell. In the second case, much like the 
accidents in the lifts and ladders category, the accident occurred when there was an 
undesired change in the boom’s potential energy to kinetic energy as it fell. The third 
case involved several environmental factors, but essentially the kinetic energy of the 
wind and the waves was transferred to the crane in a way that was unexpected and 
undesired. The crane’s motion due to the unexpected gain in kinetic energy resulted in 
the failure of the crane itself causing injury to the human operator. 
 
Elevators 
         Three cases are documented for the elevators category. One accident occurred 
when the victim was riding in the elevator and it jerked causing the rider to fall and 
sustain injuries. The other two accidents are similar in nature. In another case, the victim 
was crushed under the portable elevator when it unexpectedly fell, resulting in the death 
of the victim. In the last case, the victim was performing maintenance and was caught 
under the elevator as it unexpectedly fell, also resulting in death. 
         From an energy perspective, the deaths were caused by an undesired change in 
large potential energy to kinetic energy as the elevators fell on top of the victims. The 
case involving just an injury resulted in an unexpected change in the magnitude of the 
kinetic energy leading to a jerking motion of the elevator with the rider inside. 
 
Belts 
         The accidents documented involving belts have to do with the operator’s hand or 
clothing getting caught in a rotating belt and being pulled into an even more dangerous 
area of the system, such as a quickly rotating blade. 
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         From an energy perspective, the accident occurred when there was an unwanted 
transfer of the belt’s kinetic energy to the human operator, pulling the operator into a 
situation that can lead to further unwanted energy transfers such as coming in contact 
with the large rotational kinetic energy of a blade within the system. 
 
Takeaways 
The most important piece of information from this exercise is the interpretation 
of the accident in terms of energy transfers within the system because this alone can 
determine if the baseline theory holds true. The information contained in the Size, 
Weight, and Mag. of Energy columns are documented in order to determine a 
relationship between these factors and the severity of the injury sustained by the 
individual. This information is particularly important in the development of an eventual 
ranking system for the hazards. However, ranking the hazards is not within the scope of 
this project. Overall, this exercise validated the baseline theory that accidents occur 
when there is an unwanted change or transfer of energy within a system because all 82 
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CHAPTER IV 
ETCHIM DEVELOPMENT  
 
This chapter discusses the steps taken to develop the procedure and tools needed 
to complete the ETCHIM, followed by an example. 
 
Procedure Development 
The purpose of the ETCHIM is to aid designers during the initial hazard 
identification process in realizing hazards that could potentially go unforeseen. Current 
methods are completely manual, so adding automation to the process can help reduce 
human error when completing the structured portion of the hazard identification process 
[31]. The ETCHIM’s procedures are developed to combat the oftentimes-flawed effort 
of the human mind in doing ‘cut and paste’ tasks by allowing automation to complete 
such activities. 
Based on the theory that accidents occur when there is an undesired change in 
energy, the success of the method is centered on identifying energized components 
within the system. In order to identify components within a system and their energies, 
the first step is to define the mission of the system and how each component participates. 
It is important to understand that a human operator is considered a system component 
and should be included accordingly. Defining the mission of a system can be achieved 
using a number of established methods. It is crucial to understand the function of each 
component because this feature will help the designer determine what energy forms are 
present. A description of the system’s immediate environment must also be included. An 
example of what should be included in the description of the system is provided in the 
‘Example’ portion of this section. Once the components and their functions are 
identified, the designer fills out the table shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Component-energy table used to document system information. 
Component Translation Potential Rotation 
	   	   	   	  
    
 
 
Each component identified in the system and immediate environment is listed in the first 
column of Table 2. In the remaining columns, an “X” is input if the corresponding 
component possesses that form of energy within the system and an “O” is input if it does 
not possess that form of energy. For instance, if Component A moves horizontally and 
vertically within its system, there should be an “X” in the Translation and Potential 
columns and an “O” in the Rotation column. Once the designer documents the required 
information for each component, the table is used to determine all of the possible 
conversions and transfers of the existing energies within the system. Using the example 
of Component A, the possible energy changes are: 
 
1) Component A translation converted to potential 
2) Component A translation converted to rotation 
3) Component A potential converted to translation 
4) Component A potential converted to rotation 
 
If another system component, Component B, possesses potential and rotation, the 
possible energy transfers are: 
 
1) Component A translation transferred to Component B 
2) Component A potential transferred to Component B 
3) Component B potential transferred to Component A 
4) Component B rotation transferred to Component A 
 
The given energy conversions and transfers are then used to brainstorm possible accident 
scenarios within the system, identifying hazards in the process. To determine the 
plausibility of the outputs, a system is created that mimics one of the documented 
product liability cases. Using the description of the system, the ETCHIM is performed 
and accident scenarios are identified (see Appendix for test case). At the end of the 
exercise, it is determined that the actual accident scenario is detected. 
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While brainstorming accident scenarios for the test case, it becomes evident that 
there are not any hazardous scenarios associated with an energy conversion to potential 
or a component’s potential energy transferring to another component. This notion is 
verified in recognizing that an accident never occurred due to a change to potential or a 
transfer of potential from one component to another in all 82 product liability cases 
analyzed. Through an additional inspection of potential energy, it is recognized that a 
hazardous situation is not caused by a change to potential energy or a transfer of 
potential energy between components, but rather by an instance in which potential 
energy changes to translation or rotation. In conclusion, any outputs that indicate a 
change to potential energy or a transfer of potential energy between components are 
discarded from the analysis.   
 Due to the repetitive and straightforward nature of cross-referencing the table 
entries, automation is desired to perform such a task [32]. 
   
Algorithm Development 
 Requiring the human designer to perform a task that an algorithm can perform in 
a fraction of the time is senseless and wasteful. Python is used to write an algorithm that 
takes the entries of the component-energy table as an input, manipulate the entries to 
indicate the possible conversions and transfers of energy as the output, and create an 
editable comma separated (csv) file that displays the output for the human designer. The 
designer can then interact with the csv file to complete the brainstorming portion of the 
ETCHIM, providing desirable tools such as ‘Sort’ and ‘Filter’ along with color-coding.  
 The algorithm code (see Appendix) consists of one function that uses ‘if-
statements’ and while loops to achieve its mission of creating the desired output of 
changes and transfers of energy. The code is designed to take a text (txt) file as the input 
and parse it based on spaces and lines within the file. To create such a text file, the 
component-energy table is created in an Excel spreadsheet with the following headers 
and corresponding cells: 
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1) ‘Component’ in cell A1 
2) ‘Translation’ in cell B1 
3) ‘Potential’ in cell C1 
4) ‘Rotation’ in cell D1 
 
It is important to note that when inputting the system components, only one word should 
be used as a descriptor. However, if multiple words are required to name a component, a 
space should not be included between words. For example, instead of inputting 
‘Conveyor Belt’, it should be typed as ‘ConveyorBelt’ or ‘Conveyor_Belt’. This nuance 
stems from the way the code parses the text file. When the code detects a space, it treats 
the characters before and after as two different entries. A faulty output is created if the 
name of a component is read as two separate entries. The name of the component must 
be read as one entry, so it must be typed as such. A snapshot of how the Excel 
spreadsheet should be filled out is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Snapshot of the appropriate set-up of the component-energy table in Excel. 
 
 
Once the component-energy table is created in Excel, the spreadsheet is saved as a text 
(.txt) file with a system-appropriate name. The code is run, prompting the user to input 
the name of the text file. After the name of the text file is entered and the algorithm 
compiles, the csv file with the output appears in the same folder the text file is saved in 
on the computer. The designer uses the csv file to analyze the different energy changes 
and transfers to brainstorm possible accident scenarios. Overall, the inclusion of the 
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algorithm provides automation in a way that can reduce human error during the 
repetitive task of cross-referencing the entries in the input table [31].  
 
ETCHIM Example 
An example system is provided below. The excerpt provides the system’s 
description; Table 3 shows the corresponding component-energy table, and Figure 2 
shows the algorithm output. 
 
Jane’s job is to move a log sitting at the top of a hill to the bottom of the hill where a pile 
of logs 5 feet high sits. In order to do this, Jane mounts and then rides atop a machine 
that picks up the log, moves the log to the edge of the hill, then drops the log. Once 
dropped, the log rolls down the hill at a high speed until it comes to a stop just before the 
pile without hitting it. 
 
 




The Hazard Guide shown in Figure 3 helps the designer interpret the output of the 
algorithm and is developed using the accident energy interpretations that came out of the 
case study exercise. 
The Hazard Guide is developed using the information gathered in the energy 
interpretation column of the case study exercise. It is through this information that the 
behavior of the different types of energies that lead to accidents is revealed. The 
different conversions and transfers listed as examples in the Hazard Guide stem from all 
82 product liability cases analyzed in the case study exercise. So, every accident from 
the exercise is effectively described by the information contained in the guide. The 
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wording within the guide is somewhat vague intentionally so it can be used for any 
mechanical system. Even though the guide captures every accident in the case study 
exercise, it is important to note that the guide is exactly that, a guide. It is meant to 
provide ideas of how to interpret the algorithm outputs, but is not necessarily exclusive 




Figure 2: Algorithm output based on the component-energy table. 
 
 





Figure 3: Guide used to interpret the output of the algorithm. 
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This chapter details the steps involved to test the performance of the ETCHIM. It 
discusses the formal hypotheses of the experiment, setting up the experiment, the 
individuals involved, the data analysis approach, and the results. 
 
Formal Hypotheses 
In order to test the performance of the ETCHIM with respect to the What-If/Checklist, 
the collected data is used to test the following hypothesis pairs: 
 
Null: The means of the number of hazards identified with ETCHIM and What-
If/Checklist are equal. 
Alternate: The mean of the number of hazards identified with ETCHIM is greater than 
What-If/Checklist. 
 
Null: The frequencies of identifying the actual accident of each system with ETCHIM 
and What-If/Checklist are equal. 
Alternate: The frequency of identifying the actual accident of each system with 
ETCHIM is greater than What-If/Checklist. 
 
Null: The means of the number of hazards identified by individuals with hazard 
identification experience and individuals without hazard identification experience are 
equal. 
Alternate: The mean number of hazards identified is greater for individuals with hazard 
identification experience. 
 
Null: The frequencies of identifying the actual accident of each system by individuals 
with hazard identification experience and individuals without hazard identification 
experience are equal. 
Alternate: The frequencies of identifying the actual accident of each system by 
individuals with hazard identification experience and individuals without hazard 
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Experimental Setup and Methodology 
To test the formal hypotheses of the project, an experiment involving human 
subjects is conducted. For the study, each participant analyzes two different systems that 
are based on two of the previously assessed product liability cases. The two systems and 
descriptions of their actual accident scenarios are displayed in the Appendix.  
The objective of the participants is to identify the hazards that exist within each system. 
Because of the scope of its development, the ETCHIM only captures hazards that exist 
in mechanical systems. Thus, all participants are instructed to identify hazards that have 
to do with the mechanics of the system.  
Before analyzing the systems, each participant fills out a pre-study questionnaire 
that asks about their level of experience in hazard identification, their highest degree 
received, and the nature of their occupation (i.e. engineering, business, etc.). 
Additionally, the individuals in the ETCHIM group complete a short worksheet training 
exercise that re-familiarizes them with kinetic and potential energies and how to 
recognize them within a system. The pre-study questionnaire and training worksheet can 
be seen in the Appendix.  
After completing the analysis of the two systems, each participant fills out a post-
study survey (see Appendix) that asks them to rate how easy the method was to use, the 
level of mental effort they expended during the exercise, and whether or not they would 
use the method again, which is followed by a free response section allowing them to 
provide any comments about the experience.  
  
Pilot Study 
 To establish the fluidity of the experiment, a pilot test is conducted. A group of 7 
individuals from Sandia National Laboratories critically evaluate the instructions of the 
experiment by running through it. As the participants work through the procedures, they 
are encouraged to ask any questions that arise concerning the required activities. The 
questions and subsequent answers are documented (see Appendix). After the experiment 
is over, the participants are given the opportunity to record any concerns about the 
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procedures. The feedback given by the participants both during the experiment and after 
are used to update the instructions to establish fluidity within the procedures. The 
procedures of the experiment can be seen in the Appendix. 
 
Study Comparing the ETCHIM and What-If/Checklist 
 To test ETCHIM, 36 individuals participate in a study that compares ETCHIM to 
the existing What-If/Checklist method. The participants are Sandia National 
Laboratories employees, have at least an undergraduate level experience in physics, are 
competent with Microsoft Office, and are at least 18 years old. For the control group, 19 
of the participants are randomly assigned to analyze the given systems using the What-
If/Checklist method. As the experimental group, the remaining 17 participants use the 
ETCHIM to identify hazards. 
 
Data Analysis Approach 
 Two raters independently assess the data to determine the number of hazards 
each participant identified within each system and whether or not the actual accident 
scenario was identified for each system. The inter-rater agreement is determined using 
Cohen’s Kappa [33] and is found to be 0.931. As per [34], this correlation exceeds the 
threshold necessary to accept the data assessment rubric, which can be seen in the 
Appendix.  
Normality and equal variance tests are completed to determine the appropriate 
means comparison test for the number of hazards identified in each system. The results 
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Table 4: Summary of Shapiro Wilk’s normality test in JMP for each set of data. 
System Method p-value Significance level 
1 What/If Checklist 0.23 0.05 
ETCHIM 0.13 0.05 
2 What If/Checklist 0.39 0.05 
ETCHIM 0.40 0.05 
 
 
Table 5: Summary of Levene’s equal variance tests between the Control and 
Experimental data sets in each system. 
System p-value Significance level 
1 0.0005 0.05 
2 0.009 0.05 
 
 
Based on the results of the normality tests, all of the p-values are larger than the 
significance level so the null hypothesis that the data come from a normal distribution is 
not rejected. Levene’s test for equal variances results in a rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the variances of the compared data are equal, which is indicated in the determination 
that both p-values are less than the significance level. Based on the results of these tests, 
Welch’s test is selected to compare the means of the data because it operates under the 
assumptions that the data is normally distributed and have unequal variances. Also, 
Fisher’s Exact Test [33] is selected to perform the proportions comparisons. 
 
Results of Study 
This section details the results of the experiment and provides a discussion of the 
implications of the results. Figures 4 and 5 display samples of the data that is gathered 
during the experiment. 
 

































Number of Hazards Identified 
In order to determine which method produced the greater number of hazards 
identified, the data is split into System 1 and System 2 groups and then split further into 
Control (What-If/Checklist) and Experimental (ETCHIM) resulting in four groups of 
data. Figures 6 and 7 display the means of each group analyzed.  
Figure 6: Bar chart showing the mean number of hazards identified for System 1 for 
each group. 
Within the System 1 and System 2 data sets, the means of the Control and Experimental 
groups are compared. The null hypothesis of Welch’s t-test states that the means of the 
two data sets are equal. The alternate hypothesis states that the mean of the Experimental 
group is greater than the mean of the Control group, providing a one-tailed test. The 
results of the means comparison for both System 1 and System 2 are summarized in 
Table 6. 
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Figure 7: Bar chart showing the mean number of hazards identified for System 2 for 
each group. 
Table 6: Summary of Welch’s t-test comparing the means of the Control and 
Experimental data sets within each system. 
System Null Hypothesis Alternate Hypothesis p-value Significance 
level 
1 µexp = µctl µexp - µctl > 0 0.0001 0.05 
2 µexp = µctl µexp - µctl > 0 0.0001 0.05 
In both systems, the calculated p-value is less than the significance level so the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the alternate hypothesis is accepted. In conclusion, the number 
of hazards identified using the ETCHIM is significantly greater than the number of 
hazards identified using What-If/Checklist for both systems. More specifically, on 
average, the ETCHIM identified roughly 119 percent more hazards than the What-
If/Checklist for System 1 and roughly 121 percent more for System 2. 
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Correctly Identified Accident Scenario 
In order to determine which method correctly identified the accident scenarios of 
the systems more often, the data is split up into System 1 and System 2 groups. System 1 
and System 2 are further split into Control and Experimental groups, which results in 
four groups. The data is presented in the form of two contingency tables, one for each 
system, which can be seen in Figures 8 and 9. 






















Figure 8: Contingency table for identifying the actual accident in System 1. 
Count 
Total % 






















Figure 9: Contingency table for identifying the actual accident in System 2. 
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The differences observed between the methods in Figures 7 and 8 are tested for 
significance using a proportions comparison test. The results of Fisher’s Exact tests for 
proportions comparison for each system are summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7: Summary of Fisher’s Exact tests for System 1 and System 2. 
System Null Hypothesis Alternate Hypothesis p-value Significance 
level 
1 Pexp = Pctl Pexp - Pctl > 0 0.986 0.05 
2 Pexp = Pctl Pexp - Pctl > 0 0.140 0.05 
Based on the results from Fisher’s Exact test, for both systems, the p-value is greater 
than the significance level. Thus, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. This means 
there is insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis that the proportion of correct 
identification of the actual accident scenario is the same for both methods. In conclusion, 
the ETCHIM did not perform better than the What-If/Checklist method in correctly 
identifying the actual accident scenarios. 
Performance Assessment of Participants with Hazard Identification Experience 
In order to determine the performance of participants with hazard identification 
experience compared to participants without experience, the data is split into System 1 
and System 2 groups, and then further split up into Control and Experimental groups 
resulting in four groups. Within each of the four groups, a means comparison of the 
number of hazards identified is performed between the groups with and without hazard 
identification experience. The results of the four tests are summarized in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Summary of means comparison tests between groups with and without hazard 
identification experience. 
System Method p-value Significance level 
1 What-If/Checklist 0.53 0.05 
ETCHIM 0.47 0.05 
2 What-If/Checklist 0.50 0.05 
ETCHIM 0.77 0.05 
Based on the results in Table 8, the null hypothesis in all four cases cannot be rejected 
due to the p-values being greater than the significance level. This means that there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the notion that the number of hazards identified by 
participants with hazard identification experience is not different from the number of 
hazards identified by participants without hazard identification experience. 
Next, each of the four groups undergoes a proportions comparison to determine 
how well participants with hazard identification experience performed when it came to 
identifying the actual accident scenario in each system. These results are summarized in 
Table 9. 
Table 9: Summary of proportions comparison between groups with and without hazard 
identification experience. 
System Method p-value Significance level (two-tail) 
1 What-If/Checklist 1.000 0.025 
ETCHIM 0.302 0.025 
2 What-If/Checklist 1.000 0.025 
ETCHIM 0.044 0.025 
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Based on the results in Table 9, the null hypothesis for all four tests cannot be rejected 
because all the p-values are greater than the two-tailed significance level. This means 
that the evidence is insufficient to reject the notion that participants correctly identify the 
actual accident scenario with the same frequency regardless of possession of hazard 
identification experience. 
Discussion of Results 
In terms of each method’s performance, ETCHIM identified significantly more 
hazards in both systems than the What-If/Checklist method. However, the ETCHIM did 
not perform significantly better than the What-If/Checklist in identifying the actual 
accident in each system. This could be due to the novelty and inexperience with 
ETCHIM and the underlying theory that accidents occur when there is an undesired 
change in energy. Seeing accidents from an energy perspective may seem too technical 
for users not trained, or versed, in the subject area. Also, requiring the user to assess 
each output while referencing the hazard guide could be burdensome, especially in a 
time crunch. In a case such as this, it is a reasonable response for the user to stop 
referencing the hazard guide to lessen the burden. Even though the What-If/Checklist 
method requires referencing a checklist, it does not pose the same demands as ETCHIM 
because it doesn’t require the assessment of an entire list of potential hazards. The What-
If/Checklist method allows the user to end his/her analysis as soon as the brainstorming 
capacity has been exhausted. On the other hand, ETCHIM demands that the user assess 
at least the number of potential hazards listed in the output. This demand could explain 
the increased number of hazards identified. 
In terms of the performance of participants with hazard identification experience, 
these individuals did not perform any better than those without hazard identification 
experience. The hypothesis that both groups perform equally in the number of hazards 
identified and identifying the actual accident of each system could not be rejected due to 
insufficient evidence. This is a surprising outcome considering that individuals with 
hazard identification experience were expected to identify more hazards and more 
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frequently identify the actual accident scenarios. Requiring the participants to only 
identify hazards mechanical in nature could have played a part in leveling the 
performance of the two groups. Individuals with hazard identification experience may 
not necessarily be specifically versed in the mechanical domain. Imposing this limitation 
for the sake of method comparison could have affected the individuals with hazard 
identification experience in a way that limited their performance. A second possibility 
for equal performance of individuals with and without hazard identification experience is 
that the systems provided in the experiment are simplified to the point where 
experienced individuals are unable to utilize the skills that truly set them apart from 
inexperienced individuals. 
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CHAPTER VI  
IMPROVEMENT 
This chapter details the development, testing, and performance of the 
improvement made to the ETCHIM. 
Improvement Development 
The ETCHIM is designed in a way that the user must reference an outside 
source, the Hazard Guide. The suggested improvement would be to eliminate the Hazard 
Guide by incorporating it into the Python algorithm, which can be seen in the Appendix. 
The addition of the Hazard Guide to the algorithm code is substantiated by the 
realization that the subjectivity of the brainstorming process lies in thinking of accident 
scenarios, not in determining what a certain conversion or transfer of energy indicates. 
The behavior of energy is objective. Subjectivity arises while brainstorming the 
particular circumstances within the system in which a deviation will occur. The 
algorithm output for the same example provided in Chapter II using the improved 
ETCHIM can be seen in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Algorithm output for the improved ETCHIM. 
With the algorithm updated, the improved ETCHIM is tested against the unimproved 
ETCHIM in a similar fashion as the first experiment that compared What-If/Checklist 
and the unimproved ETCHIM.  
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Testing Improvement 
The following hypothesis sets are of particular interest to assess the improved 
ETCHIM with respect to its unimproved form: 
Null: The means of the number of hazards identified for the unimproved and improved 
ETCHIM are equal. 
Alternate: The mean of the number of hazards identified by improved ETCHIM is 
greater than the unimproved ETCHIM. 
Null: The frequencies of identifying the actual accident of each system for the improved 
and unimproved ETCHIM are equal. 
Alternate: The frequency of identifying the actual accident of each system using the 
improved ETCHIM is greater than the unimproved ETCHIM. 
For this experiment, there are 40 participants who are graduate students at Texas A&M 
University. Half of the participants carry out the experiment’s exercises using the 
unimproved ETCHIM (control) while the other half use the improved ETCHIM 
(experimental). The procedures for the experiment are identical to those of the first 
experiment, except instead of completing the training worksheet, the participants receive 
a lecture on ETCHIM. The information included in the PowerPoint lecture can be seen 
in Appendix.  
Data Analysis 
For the number of hazards identified, the normality tests of the data indicated that 
the data come from a normal distribution. Levene’s test for equal variance indicated that 
the data come from distributions with equal variances, unlike the first experiment. 
Tables 10 and 11 show the results of the normality and equal variance tests.  
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Table 10: Results of Shapiro Wilk’s normality test in JMP statistical software for each 
data set. 
System Method p-value Significance level 
1 Unimproved 0.33 0.05 
Improved 0.94 0.05 
2 Unimproved 0.41 0.05 
Improved 0.08 0.05 
Table 11: Results of Levene’s test for equal variance in JMP for the data sets within 
each system. 
System p-value Significance level 
1 0.45 0.05 
2 0.38 0.05 
The data shows that all of the p-values are larger than the significance level, so the null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected, which indicates the distributions are treated as normal 
and have equal variances. Thus, the Student’s t-test [33] is used to compare the means of 
the improved and unimproved data sets.  
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Results of Testing 
This section presents the results of the experiment in tabular and graphical form, 
followed by an explanation of the results. 
Number of Hazards Identified 
Figures 11 and 12 display the means of the number of hazards identified for each group 
analyzed.  
Figure 11: Bar chart showing the mean number of hazards identified for System 1 
for each group. 
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Figure 12: Bar chart showing the mean number of hazards identified for System 2 
for each group. 
Table 12 details the statistical results of the Student’s t-test for the means comparison. 
Table 12: Comparison of the means of the number of hazards identified using Student’s 
t-test. 
System Null Hypothesis Alternate Hypothesis p-value Significance 
level 
1 µexp = µctl µexp - µctl > 0 0.03 0.05 
2 µexp = µctl µexp - µctl > 0 0.03 0.05 
Correct Identification of Actual Accident 
Figures 13 and 14 show the contingency tables produced for the frequencies of 
identifying the actual accident. 
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Figure 13: Contingency table for identifying the actual accident in System 1. 


















Figure 14: Contingency table for identifying the actual accident in System 2. 
Table 13 details the statistical results of Fisher’s Exact tests for the proportions 
comparisons. 
Table 13: Results of Fisher’s Exact tests to determine if the improved ETCHIM 
identified the actual accident more frequently for each system. 
System p-value Significance level 
1 0.12 0.05 
2 0.38 0.05 
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Based on the results in Table 12, the improved ETCHIM (experimental) identified a 
greater number of hazards for both systems than the unimproved ETCHIM (control) for 
both systems because the p-values are smaller than the significance level, which 
indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis. Even though the improved ETCHIM 
identified more hazards, the results in Table 13 indicate that there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the hypothesis that the improved ETCHIM identifies the actual 
accident equally as frequently as the unimproved ETCHIM for both systems. 
  
Discussion of Results 
 The improvement of the ETCHIM is designed to help participants identify the 
actual accident of each system more than the participants using the unimproved 
ETCHIM, but not necessarily identify more accidents. Thus, the results of the 
experiment are not expected, which could be due to a combination of reasons. The first 
reason being that even though participants using the unimproved method had to 
reference the separate hazard guide, they were still able to effectively use the guide, 
leveling the performance of the improved ETCHIM. For the first system, identifying the 
actual accident was heavily reliant on the participants’ recognition that the ocean’s 
waves should be considered a major environmental component of the system’s 
immediate environment. Many participants, in both groups, were unable to recognize the 
waves as a system component, which is believed to be due to a lack of training, or 
experience, in the method. For the second system, participants oftentimes recognized 
that the piece of wood coming in contact with the saw blade was intended within the 
system. However, despite the guidance provided directly in the output of the improved 
ETCHIM, many participants were unable to recognize that the hazard in that particular 
contact was rooted in the potential for the wood to kickback toward the operator. It is 
believed that the lack of recognition in this situation could be due to a lack of training, or 
experience, in the method. 
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CHAPTER VII  
SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the project, along with a discussion of the 
contribution of the work and what can be done moving forward. 
 
Summary 
The inspiration of this project was the realization that engineered systems are still 
failing in ways that injure the human user or critically damage equipment. As an 
engineer, the need to keep the public safe initiated a deep look into current hazard 
identification methods to discover any weaknesses or limitations that could be combated 
through redevelopment. The methods that were found to be of particular interest were 
the Preliminary Hazard List (PHL), What-If/Checklist, and Energy Trace Barrier 
Analysis (ETBA). The structure of the PHL and What-If/Checklist methods were very 
similar to the envisioned structure for ETCHIM, which is designed to solely identify 
hazards within a system while providing a brief, preliminary assessment of the hazard 
consequences. The output list of hazards can then be used as an input to techniques and 
methods that are designed for hazard analysis such as the Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
(PHA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). 
Rather than structure, it was the ETBA’s underlying theory that accidents occur when 
there is an undesired transfer of energy within a system that aligned with the interest of 
the project. The development of the ETCHIM was centered on the pursuit of meshing 
the structure of the PHL and What-If/Checklist methods and the theory of the ETBA in a 
way that automation could be introduced and more hazards identified. 
 To develop the ETCHIM using the theory that accidents occur when there is an 
unwanted transfer of energy within a system, the underlying causes of accidents had to 
be explored. This was achieved by analyzing product liability cases found in the 
WestlawNext database through Texas A&M [28]. The product liability cases selected 
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were limited to those of a mechanical nature so that the analysis included only kinetic 
and gravitational potential energy forms. The decision to scale all energy forms to 
kinetic and gravitational potential was made to ensure understanding and confidence in 
the proceeding development. Analyzing the product liability cases resulted in the 
confirmation that accidents can be interpreted in terms of undesired energy transfers or 
changes within a system, which provided verification of the ETCHIM’s underlying 
theory. The exercise also provided insight into how kinetic and potential energies 
operate within a system and the possible consequences if an energy flow is disrupted in 
an undesired way. Using the knowledge gained from the case study exercise, 
development of the ETCHIM’s method began. 
To determine changes or transfers of energy in a system, it is crucial to first 
identify the energized components. Therefore, the first step of the method requires the 
designer to use a decomposition of the system based on the functions of each component 
to tabulate the components and corresponding energies assuming the system functions as 
intended. Once the information is tabulated, an automatic manipulation of the 
information is performed in a Python script to provide the designer with an output that 
considers all the unwanted transfers of, and changes in, energy within the defined 
system. The output is essentially a list of potential hazards within the system and the 
designer is then tasked with the exercise of brainstorming accident scenarios associated 
with each potential hazard. In order to help the designer interpret the provided output, a 
separate hazard guide was created using the information gathered during the case study 
exercise. The effectiveness of the newly developed ETCHIM had to be measured. 
  In order to assess the ETCHIM, an experiment was designed to compare it to an 
existing method. Due to the particular interest expressed by Sandia National 
Laboratories, the What-If/Checklist method was chosen to be the control method. Once 
the experiment was fully designed, a pilot study was conducted to refine the procedures 
and required activities. After refinement, the actual experiment included 36 Sandia 
National Laboratories employees, 19 of which acted as the What-If/Checklist (Control) 
group and 17 as the ETCHIM (Experimental) group. The results of the experiment 
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concluded that the ETCHIM identified more hazards than the What-If/Checklist method, 
the evidence was insufficient to reject equal frequencies of actual accident identification 
for the ETCHIM and What-If/Checklist in each system, and individuals with existing 
hazard identification experience did not perform better than those without. In an attempt 
to create an ETCHIM that performs better than the What-If/Checklist in identifying the 
actual accident scenario, a suggested improvement was made. 
The ETCHIM’s requirement to reference a separate hazard guide to interpret the 
Python code output was believed to be a source of error when identifying the actual 
accident in each system. Thus, the hazard guide was incorporated into the Python script 
so the information presented in the guide is reflected within the output. This action 
eliminated the requirement to reference a separate information source. Another 
experiment was designed to test the improved ETCHIM with the unimproved. For the 
experiment, 40 mechanical engineering graduate students at Texas A&M University 
participated with 20 of them acting as the control (unimproved) group and the other 20 
as the experimental (improved). The results of the experiment indicated that the 
improved ETCHIM identified more hazards for both systems than the unimproved. 
However, the improved did not necessarily correctly identify the actual accident scenario 
more than the unimproved. Thus, the incorporation of the hazard guide in the Python 
script did not affect the performance of the ETCHIM in the identification of the actual 
accident. With this result, it is believed that the success of identifying the actual accident 




Throughout this project, a hazard identification method (ETCHIM) was 
developed and tested. Compared to the What-If/Checklist, the ETCHIM identified more 
hazards in each analyzed system, but did not identify the actual accident more 
frequently. The inability of the ETCHIM to identify the actual accident more frequently 
than the What-If/Checklist is believed to be rooted in the inherent inexperience in using 
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a novel method, along with the requirement of referencing a separate guide. In 
attempting to improve the method, the hazard guide is incorporated into the algorithm 
output so the user does not have to reference an outside source. Without understanding 
the costs and benefits of different training methods, the Texas A&M individuals testing 
the improvement of the ETCHIM receive a different training than the Sandia individuals 
in the first experiment. It is highly believed that the lecture-style training for the second 
experiment is inadequate compared to the worksheet-style training of the first 
experiment. With proper training, it is believed that the improved ETCHIM will perform 
better than the What-If/Checklist at identifying more hazards and the actual accident 
scenario. Thus, the exploration and creation of a training scheme for the ETCHIM is 
necessary. Future work could also include precision and recall experiments to compare 
the ETCHIM and existing methods where precision is concerned with how many of the 
hazards identified are actually hazards and recall is concerned with whether or not all of 
the hazards in the system are identified. 
It is important to recognize that the ETCHIM was developed using mechanical 
products and only considers kinetic and gravitational potential energy forms within 
systems. Future work would include studying and adding other forms of energy such as 
electrical, chemical, and thermal to broaden the application of the ETCHIM to more 
systems.  
In its essence, the ETCHIM provides both a structured and creative approach to 
identify hazards within a system from the perspective that unwanted changes in energy 
cause accidents. The process of first identifying system components and associated 
energies is a logical endeavor that creates a framework for developing an algorithm 
output that is tailored to the system. The creative process of brainstorming accident 
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A1: List of documented product liability cases 
Sansom	  v	  Crown	  
Equipment 
Plante	  v	  Hobart	  Company Pate	  v	  Columbia	  Mach.	  Inc	   Robertson	  v	  Superior	  PMI,	  
Inc 
Jackson	  v	  Louisville	  Ladder	  
Inc 
Horstmyer	  v	  Black	  and	  
Decker 
Mullins	  v	  MGD	  Graphics	  
Systems	  
Karns	  v	  Emerson	  Electric	  
Co 
Peart	  v	  Dorel	  Juvenile	  
Group 
Kessler	  v	  Bowie	  Machine	  
Works 
Burke	  v	  Spartanics	  Ltd	   Smith	  v	  Dainichi	  Kinzoku	  
Kogyo	  Co 
Masello	  v	  The	  Stanley	  
Works 
Dorsey	  v	  Yoder Burt	  v	  Makita	  USA	   Deviner	  v	  Electrolux	  
Motor 
Sappington	  v	  Skyjack	  Inc Siemer	  v	  Midwest	  Mower	   Gillispie	  v	  Sears	  Roebuck	   Childress	  v	  Gresen	  Mfg.	  Co 
Burke	  v	  Quick	  Lift Purkey	  v	  Sears	  Roebuck Johnson	  v	  Black	  and	  
Decker	  
Moore	  v	  Powermatic 
Santos	  v	  Sunrise	  Medical DePree	  v	  Nutone	  Inc Gross	  v	  Black	  and	  Decker	   Robertson	  v	  Norton	  Co. 
Oettinger	  v	  Norton	  Co. Ward	  v	  Hobart	  Mfg.	  Co. Ross	  v	  Black	  and	  Decker	   Schenfeld	  v	  Norton 
Taylor	  v	  Paul	  O.	  Abbe Herman	  v	  C.O.	  Porter	  
Machinery 
Van	  Scoy	  v	  Powermatic	   Trowbridge	  v	  Abrasive	  Co 
Bjerk	  v	  Universal	  
Engineering	  Corp 
Henrich	  v	  Cutler	  Hammer	  
Co 
Stolarik	  v	  Hendrick	  Mfg.	   Tomao	  v	  A.P.	  de	  Sanno 
Hagan	  v	  EZ	  Mfg.	  Co. McPhee	  v	  Oliver	  Tyrone	   Cates	  v	  Sears	  Roebuck	   Bustamante	  v	  
Carborundum 
Tipton	  v	  Bergohr	  GMBH-­‐
Siegen 
Sowles	  v	  Urschel	  
Laboratories 
Hood	  v	  Ryobi	  American	  
Corp	  
Daleiden	  v	  Carborundum 
London	  v	  MAC	  Corp	  of	  
America 
Perkins	  v	  Emerson	  Elec	  Co. Hutchison	  v	  Urschel	  
Laboratories	  
McGrath	  v	  Wallace	  
Murray	  Corp 
Belec	  v	  Hayssen	  Mfg.	  Co. Poland	  v	  Beaird-­‐Poulan Connelly	  v	  Sears	  Roebuck	   Twigg	  v	  Norton	  Co 
Clarke	  v	  LR	  Systems Hopkins	  v	  Chip-­‐In-­‐Saw,	  Inc Browne	  v	  Bark	  River	  
Culvert	  
Stokes	  v	  L.	  Geismar 
Osorio	  v	  One	  World	  
Technologies 
Post	  v	  Textron Harrison	  v	  Otis	  Elevator	   Williams	  v	  Monarch	  Mach.	  
Tool	  Co.,	  Inc 
Briney	  v	  Sears,	  Roebuck Lenior	  v	  C.O.	  Porter	  
Machinery	  Co. 
Mesman	  v	  Crane	  Pro	  
Services	  
Campbell	  v	  Robert	  Bosch	  
Power	  Tool 
Walk	  v	  Starkey	  Machinery Webb	  v	  Rodgers	  
Machinery	  Mfg.	  Co. 
Hamilton	  v	  Emerson	  Elec.	  
Co.	  
Young	  v	  Aeroil	  Products 
Rogers	  v	  Ingersoll-­‐Rand Geboy	  v	  TRL Hagans	  v	  Oliver	  
Machinery	  
Brown	  v	  Link	  Belt	  Division 
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Porchia	  v	  Design	  
Equipment	  Co. 
Schlier	  v	  Milwaukee	  Elec	  
Tool	  Corp 
Jackson	  v	  Baldwin	  Lima	  
Hamilton	  
 
Charpie	  v	  Lowes	  Home	  
Ctrs. 
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A2: Example of the ‘test case’ for ETCHIM 
 
Product Liability Case: Sansom v Crown Equipment 
System Description:  
System involves the human operator using a forklift to retrieve a pallet being stored on a 
shelving unit and move it to a new target destination. There are two forklifts being used 





Output (First Column) and brainstorming (Second Column): Actual accident in red 
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A3: ETCHIM Algorithm code in Python 
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A4: Two systems analyzed during the experiment 
 
System 1 
Product Liability Case: Brown v Link Belt Division 
 
 
Actual Accident Scenario: The ocean’s waves crash against the crane as it transfers the 









Product Liability Case: Webb v Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co. 
Actual Accident Scenario: As the operator cuts the piece of wood with the rotating saw 
blade, a ‘kickback’ of the wood occurs resulting in harm to the operator. 
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ETCHIM Training Worksheet (the answers are given in blue) 
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A7: Questions and Answers from Pilot Study 
 
Question: In regards to Exercise 3 on the training worksheet, I said that the log pile has 
translational energy in the case that the log rolling down the hill hits the pile. Why isn’t 
this correct? 
 
Answer: When filling out the component-energy table, you must only account for the 
energies that are present during the successful completion of the system’s mission. It 
explicitly says in the system description that the log rolling down the hill stops before 
hitting the pile. Assuming it hits the pile is actually the identification of a hazard, not 
defining the intended system. 
 
 
Question: If a component within one of the systems has to turn around in order to 
achieve the mission, is that considered rotation? 
 
Answer: The rotation column is reserved for system components that are rotating at a 
high angular velocity, such as a rotating circular saw blade. A component turning in a 




Question: The first system mentions the ocean’s waves. Are the waves considered a part 
of the system? 
 
Answer: Moving fluids, such as water, can be considered system, or environmental, 
components because they have mass, can translate, rotate, or have potential. Remember 
that immediate environmental components should be included as system components. 
 
 
Question: If I forgot to name the system components using only one word, do I need to 
go back and make the names only one word in the Excel table? 
 
Answer: Yes. If the system component names have two words with a space, the output is 
not correct. Condense the names with two words into a name without a space, save the 
file into a text file, and run the algorithm again with the corrected file. 
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A10: ETCHIM Algorithm code with Hazard Guide incorporated 
 
  67 






























  74 
 
 
 
 
